

rough the tedious proc-
affidavit of William O.
al units in Memphis on
f police and he is now

on April 3, 1968, he was
t unit in the vicinity of
that a member of Dr.
units be removed from
That is, if they were
otel area, that they not
pparently, according to
site was causing some

in turn communicated
Crumby states in his
ief of police and you, of
the street commander
arrived at that led to
vicinity of five to six

the communication of
decision was made the
x blocks. Do you recall

o ask you to read from
e notification—who he
he decision as to what
ned.
at you refer to.
agraph.

fact units, each consisting of
ling the five to six-block area
d 3, 1968. All of these units
h, to remain in the general
as order was promulgated by
a unidentified member of Dr.
street commander of the fact

If and in turn by me to Chief
Frank Holloman. As a result,
g on the morning of April 4,

e pertinent part that I
A decision was made.
He said a decision was
on whatsoever of what
ted that he would have
would have reported to
Donald told me about it
that is something that I
ction of the fact units

that the mere presence
ct in the potential for

violence that might erupt around the Lorraine Motel because of
Dr. King's presence, you don't think that that was a decision—the
decision to remove them would have been brought to your atten-
tion? That that was within the—

Mr. HOLLOMAN. Well, they were not removed. They were only
removed from the immediate—from what you have said, from the
immediate vicinity. As a matter of fact, when the shot was fired,
an entire fact unit was in the fire station, so it was as close as you
could get to the Lorraine Motel almost.

Mr. SPEISER. But they were not on the street, as I understand it?

Mr. HOLLOMAN. Right.

Mr. SPEISER. It was between the fire station and the Lorraine
Motel?

Mr. HOLLOMAN. They had parked their cars between the fire
station and the boardinghouse where Mr. Ray was.

Mr. SPEISER. My last area of questioning, Mr. Holloman, concerns
the post-assassination effort or lack thereof on the part of the
Memphis Police Department to apprehend the assassin.

What, if anything, did you personally do when you were advised
of the fact that Dr. King had been killed? What was your immedi-
ate reaction?

Mr. HOLLOMAN. I was not on the scene; I was not in communica-
tion with the men on the street. I was listening to a radio which
was in my office. There were people on the scene. I was listening to
the dispatches that were being given by our dispatcher on the
radio.

I did not—I will back up a moment there. I would say that
within 30 minutes of the assassination, I was talking to the Gover-
nor of the State of Tennessee asking for the Guard to be sent back
into Memphis. But as far as I was personally, I knew that there
were commanding officers on the scene. I knew that Chief MacDon-
ald was on the way to the scene. I did not go to the scene and I did
not issue any orders myself at that time.

Mr. SPEISER. Would you say that your attention was more direct-
ed toward curbing any demonstrations and rioting within the city
of Memphis than apprehending the assassin?

Mr. HOLLOMAN. No, sir; I would not say that.

Mr. SPEISER. Would you say your attention was split equally
between those two concerns?

Mr. HOLLOMAN. Yes. I think that is a fair statement because I
had the responsibility of some 600,000 people in Memphis and I
was concerned, of course, with all of those individuals if a riot
should occur again, which it did, and which I—the first thing I
knew or thought after the assassination was that, "Here we are.
We have got another riot."

Mr. SPEISER. But you were equally concerned in apprehending
the assassin, Mr. Holloman. Why did you not specifically instruct
that an all-points bulletin be sent out and that roadblocks be set
up?

Now, for the edification of those people who are unfamiliar, an
all-points bulletin alerts the neighboring jurisdictions of the fact
that there might be a fugitive entering their jurisdiction and that
they should be aware of his presence and they are alerted to this

HSR
TB